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Abstract
This chapter captures extensive discussions between people with different forms of 
expertise and viewpoints. It explores the relationships between language and music 
in evolutionary and cultural context. Rather than trying to essentialize either, they are 
characterized pragmatically in terms of features that appear to distinguish them (such 
as language’s compositional propositionality as opposed to music’s foregrounding of 
isochronicity), and those that they evidently share. Factors are considered that consti-
tute proximate motivations for humans to communicate through language and music, 
ranging from language’s practical value in the organization of collective behavior to 
music’s signiﬁ cant role in eliciting and managing prosocial attitudes. Possible distal 
motivations are reviewed for music and language, in terms of the potentially adap-
tive functions of human communication systems, and an assessment is made of the 
advantages which might accrue to ﬂ exible communicators in the light of ethological 
and archaeological evidence concerning the landscape of selection. Subsequently, the 
possible evolutionary relationships between music and language are explored, within 
a framework supplied by six possible models of their emergence. Issues of the roles of 
culture and of biology in the evolution of communication systems are then addressed 
within the framework of triadic niche construction, and the chapter concludes by sur-
veying available comparative and phylogenetic issues that might inform the debate.
Distinguishing Music from Language
In placing music and language within the frames of culture and evolution, 
one is necessarily confronted by the question: “What is intended by the terms 
“music” and “language?” Are we dealing with culturally shaped distinctions or 
biologically distinct systems? Are music and language categorically discrete 
human faculties, or do they constitute different manifestations of the same 
underlying communicative capacities? Our initial strategy is to avoid deﬁ nitions 
in favor of identifying features that distinguish between the two domains; 
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in postulating distinct features of music and language, we run the risk of 
essentializing ethnocentric concepts or stressing between-category differences 
and minimizing within-category differences, in effect, reifying distinctions 
that may not be supported by the evidence. It must be acknowledged, however, 
that in all known human cultures, the available suite of behaviors includes 
something that appears like music, just as it includes language, though the 
extent to which categorical distinctions are drawn between music and language, 
and the factors that motivate any distinction between the two domains, differ 
across cultures.
A key attribute that appears to distinguish between the domains is 
propositionality. Language, unlike music, provides a way of sharing 
information about states of affairs by means of truth-conditional propositions 
and thus of coordinating action. It enables mapping between worlds, thoughts, 
and selves, the formulation and exchange of information, and the coordination 
of joint, goal-directed action. Music appears to have none of these functional 
beneﬁ ts, but it has others that we will consider subsequently. Nevertheless, 
music and language share the signiﬁ cant feature of generativity. Both afford 
complex combinatoriality and unlimited generativity via a few simple 
nonblending (particulate) elements into composite, individually distinctive 
patterns. Such a system has been called a Humboldt system, after Wilhelm 
von Humboldt, who ﬁ rst described language in these terms (for music, see 
Merker 2002). Combinatoriality is also found in vocal learning songbirds, such 
as the sedge warbler (Acrocephalus schoenebaenus) who varies the sequencing 
of his stock of some ﬁ fty different song elements to produce song patterns 
which essentially never repeat (Catchpole 1976). The sedge warbler’s song, 
however, is not semanticized; the different patterns pouring out of the sedge 
warbler’s throat are not invested with distinctive meanings. Moreover, other 
songbirds may only have one song, or very few variations. This is by way of 
contrast to the varied phoneme sequences in human speech, which may form 
words with learned meanings, the words in turn composing sentences, with 
the grammar of the language specifying how the meanings of words combine 
to imbue each sentence with distinctive meaning predicated on the speciﬁ c 
assembly of phonemes/words of which they consist. This is what allows 
language to carry propositional meaning riding on the phonemic stream of 
speech, by contrast to the “note stream” of music, which has no corresponding 
compositionality of meaning. Music’s combinatorial aspect falls closer to the 
sedge’s warbler’s use of combinatoriality to mount what we think of as an 
impressive aesthetic display. In any case, if the deep similarity between music 
and language is their hierarchical structure as yielded by Humboldt system 
generativity, the lack of formal semanticization in music (without lyrics) is the 
major contrast between music and language, ﬁ tting them for different uses in 
human communication. As language users, we need to share some common 
ground to conduct our dialogic and propositional transactions. This common 
ground is established largely by interaction within a shared community, being 
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built on commonalities of knowledge and belief mediated by the propositions 
shared in our linguistic exchanges or our observation of such exchanges (e.g., 
hearsay). As an evolutionary counterpoint, we may note that there is evidence 
from monkeys and chimpanzees (Crockford et al. 2004; Clay and Zuberbühler 
2011) of control or combination of vocalizations which result in a change of 
meaning, although we have here just a few such vocalizations, with neither a 
Humboldt system nor a compositional semantics.
This account needs, however, to be supplemented by the realization 
that much linguistic dialog is not concerned with the exchange of formal 
propositions but rather with maintaining social networks (Dunbar 1996; Wray 
1998), which is to say that a signiﬁ cant part of linguistic interaction is relational 
rather than transactional. Moreover, while music cannot communicate 
propositional information, the idea that music has meaning is widespread 
across cultures. In fact, music is frequently reported as bearing meanings 
similar to those transmitted by linguistic means. According to Leonard Meyer 
(1956:265), “music presents a generic event, a “connotative complex,” which 
then becomes particularized in the experience of the individual listener.” Such 
experience remains individual rather than being made mutually manifest to 
other listeners, as would be the case for language. If music is considered an 
interactive or participatory phenomenon, in contrast to the presentational form 
that it typically takes in Western conceptions (Turino 2008), close parallels 
emerge between the features of music and the relational features that sustain 
conversational interchange. Hence the criterial distinctions between music and 
language as interactive media may involve the extent to which each medium 
requires mutually comprehensible reference and foreground features concerned 
with sustaining the interaction.
While music and language appear to constitute discrete categories in con-
temporary Western societies, for many cultures they may be best conceived of 
as poles of a continuum, or there are divisions into more than two categories. 
For example, a complex set of distinctions is provided by Seeger (1987), who 
notes that primary distinctions made between “communicative genres” by the 
Suyá people of the Amazon are between three categories:
1. kaperní, which more-or-less corresponds to everyday speech, where 
there is a priority of text over melody, text and melody being determined 
by speaker, with an increasing formalization in public performance;
2. sarén, “telling” or instructional speech, where there is a relative priority 
of relatively ﬁ xed texts over relatively ﬁ xed melodies; and
3. ngére, song, where there is a priority of melody over text, and, impor-
tantly, time, text, and melody are ﬁ xed by a nonhuman source.
As Seeger (1987:50) notes, “Melody is not a particularly good way to distin-
guish between Suyá speech, instruction, and song.” Some manifestations of 
kaperní may appear to shade into manifestations of sarén; similarly, it may be 
difﬁ cult to distinguish between instances of sarén as these may, in turn, begin 
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to shade into ngére. Here, modes of communication are being distinguished on 
the basis of their social function and their proper domain: kaperní, speech, is 
for mundane, everyday use, originating with—and being directed toward—hu-
mans; sarén, didactic talk, requires authority, whether deriving from present-
day power structures or the invocation of a teacher from the past; whereas 
ngére, song, can constitute a special, liminally powerful medium, having non-
human origins and being directed, in part, toward nonhuman agency. The Suyá 
are not alone in making such distinctions; other traditional cultures frequently 
embed what may appear as speech and song to Western observers in similarly 
complex communicative taxonomies (see Basso 1985; Feld 1982; Lewis, this 
volume).
We propose, therefore, that music and language constitute a continuum 
rather than discrete domains. This continuum can be interpreted in terms of 
at least two dimensions, the ﬁ rst running from deﬁ nite to indeﬁ nite meanings 
and the second from greater to lesser affective potency. Music’s power to 
form complex patterns (enabled by its generativity), its frequent repetition 
of elements (in comparison with language), together with its iconicity (i.e., 
its exploitation of biologically signiﬁ cant aspects of sound) endow it with an 
ambiguity and an immediacy that can be emotionally compelling. Language’s 
capacity to formulate and exchange complex propositions allows it to represent 
an inﬁ nite variety of meanings and frees it, in principle, from the exigencies 
of affect. However, the discrete tones and pitch sets that supply grist for the 
musical mill in most cultures are rather unique to music, though a few birds 
(e.g., the pied butcher bird of Australia) do appear to feature them. Also, for 
humans the speaking voice is a highly signiﬁ cant biological sound whose 
emotional coloring draws on our repertoire of innate nonverbal emotional 
expressiveness. We routinely express emotion through the modality of speech 
rather than music; nothing compels music to convey emotion.
Given such blurrings of any strict dichotomy, it may be helpful to stress 
contexts of use, just as in the Suyá example above. The typical linguistic 
exchange is between two persons whereas, for most of its history, music has 
occurred in group contexts. Importantly, language and music differ in their 
power to coordinate human movement. There are differences in the regularity 
of timing between most registers of speech and most genres of music, with the 
latter featuring explicit use of isochrony, though it should be noted that this 
is a feature of both didactic talk and oratory, both oriented toward “musical” 
ends of capturing attention and enhancing a sense of mutual afﬁ liation. The 
isochrony of music facilitates the timing of one’s own movements and the 
prediction of others’ movements, allowing for mutual co-adjustment of phase 
and period in simultaneous and sequential movements. Music’s isochronicity 
and metrical structure may also underpin a greater mnemonic potential 
compared to language, or the musical feature of isochronicity itself may 
endow language with such mnemonic potential. In oral cultures, transmission 
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of cross-generational knowledge is likely to take forms that appear musical 
and poetic rather than discursive (see, e.g., Rubin 1995; Tillmann and Dowling 
2007).
Low-level differences in acoustic attributes may also warrant a clear 
distinction between music and language, or more properly, between speech and 
song. Music (song) and spoken language differ in their inter-event transitions—
the ways in which sounds succeed one another—in terms of rhythm (the 
previously noted tendency toward isochronicity) and formant transition, with 
sharper formant transitions in speech than in song. Schlaug (see, e.g., Özdemir 
et al. 2006) has suggested that the same pathways are used for the perception of 
music and speech in contrast to parallel pathways for the production of speech 
and singing, the latter arising, perhaps, from rate differences between speech 
and music. In contrast, Jarvis (2004) has suggested that the same pathways 
are used in different ways to produce song and speech; the latter is true of 
song learning birds, such as parrots, that can learn to sing as well as to imitate 
human speech.
The foregoing discussion has largely characterized music and language as 
an auditory-vocal phenomenon. Of course, both involve action in the form 
of gesture. Spoken language is typically embedded in a complex interactive 
matrix of gesture (see, e.g., Kendon 2004), and there are numerous signed 
languages. Music involves overt action, not only in its production but also as 
an interactive process or network of gestures among participants (Moran and 
Pinto 2007). Indeed, music is indissociable from dance as a cultural category 
in many societies (e.g., Stone 1998). As gestural media, music and language 
may be distinguishable in terms of timing and organization. Gestures in 
language tend to be sequential and timed in relation to prosody rather than an 
underlying rhythm, whereas those in music often involve temporal regularity 
and may involve simultaneity between participants. Nevertheless, there are 
counterexamples such as coincident gestures of participants in linguistic 
interaction, often at points of topical agreement in discourse (Gill et al. 2000), 
intermittent temporal regularity, or absence of meter in music.
Overall, no single criterial attribute, save perhaps that of propositionality, 
distinguishes between language and music clearly and comprehensively. As 
Wittgenstein (1953) noted some years ago, categories need not have criterial 
or deﬁ ning features. Instead, instances of a category can have a “family 
resemblance” or one or more common attributes shared with some but not 
all instances of the category. As with any category (e.g., birds), there are 
prototypical (e.g., robins) and less prototypical (e.g., chickens) instances 
(Rosch 1975).
One can also ask whether the features of music and language are uniquely 
human. During our discussions, we listed (Table 21.1) behavioral and neural 
parallels that have been documented in nonhuman species. In some cases, 
nonhuman animals trained by humans have succeeded in recognizing many 
words (e.g., the dog Rico; Kaminski et al. 2004), phrases (e.g., the parrot 
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Alex; Pepperberg 1999), as well as octave-transposed melodies (e.g., in rhesus 
monkeys; Wright et al. 2000). There is no indication, however, of comparable 
feats in the natural environment in these or other nonhuman species. 
Moreover, the prevailing view is that language and music are unique products 
of human culture (and nature), although elements of each may be present in 
other species. At the same time, it is important to note that stimuli and tasks 
Table 21.1  Subcomponents of music and language.
1. Behavioral Components:
a. Signal
• Perception of speech (acoustic pattern recognition system). Lexical access 
may be unique to humans, since speech perception (involving lexical access) 
involves making lexical commitments. But what about Alex, the African grey 
parrot, and Rico (Fischer’s dog)?
• Production of speech and song
• Limited vs. complex vocal learning: humans, birds
• Opportunistic multimodality: ape gestural communication
• Hypermeter: multilevel meter, hierarchical structure in whale song
• Voluntary control of vocalizations
• Instrumental, nonvocal music
b. Structure and phonology
• Syntax minus meaning, vocal combinatoriality (sequencing of learned syl-
lables): any animal that has a complex song (e.g., humans and birds), but we 
don’t know enough
• Recursion
• Scales
• Relative pitch: ferrets
• Working memory
c. Pragmatics
• Theory of mind, as evidenced in intentional communication
• Extreme sociality or the motivation to share experience
• Vocal maintenance of mother–infant bonds
• Entrainment: frogs/insects vs. parrots (cross-modal, potentially communica-
tive in relational terms)
• Dyadic dialog (context of communication), face-to-face, addressed commu-
nication, deictic switch, multimodality (i.e., the extent to which contents of 
turns are conditional on partner’s productions), agonistic versus cooperative 
engagement
d. Semantics
• Referentiality in the form of compositional semantics: unique, though precur-
sors or minimal commonalities exist (e.g., monkey booming as signifying 
negation)
• Predication (predicate/argument)
• Cultural transmission at every level in vocal communication (extreme vari-
ability of human language)
• Lack of signiﬁ cation (displacement of reference in space and time)
• Notation
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involving nonhuman participants (and even human participants) typically lack 
ecological validity. In general, nonhuman species have difﬁ culty recognizing 
transpositions of tone sequences, so it is of particular interest that European 
starlings can be trained to recognize transpositions of conspeciﬁ c songs but fail 
to recognize transposed piano melodies after comparable training (Bregman et 
al. 2012). In any case, there is no evidence of a nonhuman species, whether 
in the wild or trained by humans, whose members combine Humboldt system 
generativity with a compositional semantics.
In this chapter, we view music and language as constituting different 
manifestations of the human capacity to communicate—manifestations which 
may take very different forms in different cultural contexts. Is that partly 
because, outside of its cultural context, music cannot be deﬁ ned unambiguously? 
Persons within a culture usually have no difﬁ culty differentiating most registers 
of speech from most forms of music. One complicating factor is that we have a 
reasonable understanding of the functions of language across cultures, but we 
have much less understanding with respect to music. In considering the place 
of music and language in culture and evolution, we must address the question 
of what impels humans to communicate—through language or music.
Proximate Motivators for Human Communication
That humans are highly motivated to communicate is unquestionable; 
the issue of what may underpin that motivation is, however, less certain. 
Table 21.1 (continued)
2. Neural Components
• Auditory forebrain pathway (Wernicke’s area)
• Forebrain vocal control path of vocal structure (including Broca’s are, stria-
tum, thalamus)
• Direct connection from cortex to brainstem vocal-motor neurons: lateral mo-
tor area–laryngeal motor neurons
• Between humans and nonhuman primates, there appears to be a direct con-
nection between auditory and primary or secondary motor areas (arcuate 
fasciculus?)
• Differential gene regulation and convergent mutation in genes that make 
direct projections in other forebrain areas that control vocalizations in both 
humans and songbirds (deep homology)
• Auditory receptive ﬁ eld sharpness in humans
• Lateralization: greater specialization in humans in the representation of com-
munication sounds
• Spindle cells in anterior cingulate cortex only in humans and great apes (also 
in dolphins?)
• Heterochronicity of cortical synaptogenesis unique to humans (among 
primates)?
• Does brain size matter?
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Communication—at least, in the form of language—has immense value 
in helping groups of individuals shape their environments, individually or 
collectively, so as to attain goals. In the form of socially oriented or phatic talk, 
language can serve to build and maintain relationships in social interactions. 
There are, however, many other motivations to communicate that are likely to 
apply to a broader range of communicative systems than language alone. For 
vocal learning species, there seems to be an instrinsic pleasure in vocalizing 
(e.g., in forms such as babbling, subsong, or imitation). For humans (and 
perhaps some other primate species), vocal and gestural communication serves 
to co-regulate affective states between the caregiver and infant, and to enhance 
a sense of mutual afﬁ liation. Communication can have prosocial effects, not 
just for dyads but also for larger groups: we may gain pleasure from collective 
and synchronized performance which, in turn, reduces social uncertainty and 
helps bond the group, enhancing the effectiveness of group action and identity, 
particularly when directed against potential external threats (e.g., other groups 
or prospective predators). Of course, once we can behave linguistically or 
musically, we can be motivated to co-opt these communicative resources for 
other ends; “inner speech” may be deployed to reduce uncertainty in attention-
based coordination (Clark 2002) or to manage communication (Allwood 2007), 
whereas self-directed music may be produced as a means of affect regulation, 
as in the dit songs of the Eipo (Simon 1978).
Levinson (2006; see also this volume) argues for extraordinary human 
sociality grounded in an innate capacity for social interaction involving unique 
cognitive infrastructure (see also De Ruiter et al. 2010). Others emphasize 
the role of culture and experience in elaborating our inherited cognitive 
infrastructure (e.g., Vygotsky 1978). By 12 months of age, infants engage 
in declarative pointing to share their interest in events with others, to make 
requests, or to provide helpful information (Liszkowski 2011). They also 
vocalize to attract parents’ attention. In fact, infants vocalize well before their 
vocalizations are intentionally communicative, perhaps because vocalizing 
is intrinsically pleasurable. However, the most signiﬁ cant motivation for 
human communication is the sharing of experience; that is, wanting another 
to see, feel, think, or know what I see, feel, think, or know. Early pointing 
in infancy is of the “look at that” variety rather than the instrumental or “get 
me that” variety. The pleasure of vocalization as the motivator would lead 
to a lot more vocalization in the absence of others, but this has nothing to 
do with communication. More generally, young children make greater use 
of gesture than spoken words in their early language development (Capirci 
et al. 2002). Tomasello (2008) emphasizes how different this is from the 
instrumental form of communication in ape gestures, in which one ape tries 
to modify the behavior of another. The pleasure of vocalizing has a more 
direct utility in mother–infant interactions although such interactions proceed 
equally smoothly in deaf mother–infant dyads, who use gestural rather than 
vocal signals. Early communicative mother–infant interactions have evident 
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functions in co-regulating the affective states of both participants. Such early 
experiences may underlie the ability of music to facilitate entry into states of 
shared intentionality or even trance-type states. These capacities may be built 
on a more general substrate.
Clearly, there is more that motivates humans to communicate than 
just vocal pleasure. We gain huge practical advantages from being able 
to exchange information linguistically and to coordinate our actions with 
others. Motivational factors may drive us not only to speak but also to sing 
and move together with others in dance or synchronous movement, and this 
may strengthen social bonds (McNeill 1995). Communication by means of 
language and music affords us, respectively, the capacity for information 
transfer as well as the formation and maintenance of group solidarity. We can 
use language to get what we want and to transfer information, whereas we 
can use music to give us pleasure and to achieve group solidarity as well as 
to relieve pain and suffering and to reduce stress (Knox et al. 2011). Indeed, a 
deﬁ ning characteristic of the human species is a propensity for cooperation and 
prosociality (Levinson 2006; Tomasello 2008). We note, however, that much 
of speech does not appear to be oriented toward the transfer of information 
but to processes of establishing mutual afﬁ liation with others (i.e., functions 
which may be hypertrophied in music). We seem motivated to order social life 
through language and music, but it is notable that music, rather than language, 
tends to be at the forefront of situations where social conﬂ ict is a potential 
threat to the social order (e.g., Marett 2005).
One key factor that orders the human motivation to communicate is that 
of culture, which plays a key role in shaping, structuring, and ordering the 
human motivation to communicate, although here we have an example of an 
expanding spiral: new means to communicate support developments in culture, 
and new cultural and social processes provide an ecological niche for the 
emergence of new communicative forms. While we may gain pleasure from 
communicating or synchronizing with others, different cultures sanction these 
behaviors in different ways, with enculturation processes shaping acceptable 
patterns of communication. Notable examples can be found in some traditional 
cultures, where silent co-presence can be privileged over relationally oriented 
speech (Basso 1970), as well as in a range of situations in all cultures where 
institutions constrain or facilitate the motivation to communicate.
While pleasure (the instrumental value of a means of information exchange) 
and the human beneﬁ ts of interpersonal connections and group solidarity may 
provide proximal motivation in human communication, these forces must be 
situated in their broader evolutionary context, to which we now turn.
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Adaptive Functions of Human Communicative Systems
The most direct evidence for the emergence of complex communicative 
faculties early in the hominin lineage is in the lengthy archaeological record 
of complex lithic technologies transmitted over multiple generations. That 
persistence of cultural transmission suggests that early hominin cognitions and 
interactions must have been characterized by intense social cooperativity and 
inhibition of aggression. Material technology was employed in food acquisition 
and preparation, including group hunting, which required the recognition of 
multiple levels of intention in order to second-guess prey and coordinate group 
hunting behavior. Also required was the capacity for planning, which involves 
the manipulation of nonexistent entities and the composition of structures 
free from the immediate constraints of the physical world. Together, all these 
factors create a ﬁ tness landscape within which communicative capacities—and 
a progressive enhancement of communicative capacities—would have been 
adaptive. Of course, there would have been other selection pressures for the 
emergence of ﬂ exible communicative capacities, perhaps arising in the context 
of within-group, or sexual, competition. In addition, the effects of aspects of 
music on arousal in nonhuman species reminds us that many of the factors that 
make up the modern human communicative repertoire are likely to be shared 
with a variety of other species. Different factors are likely to have arisen at 
different times under different selection pressures, and it is likely that evidence 
for these different evolutionary time depths is embodied in the structures and 
dynamics of our neural and genetic systems.
The emotional aspects of music are often conceived of as being speciﬁ c 
to humans. However, the arousing dimension of responses to features that 
are evident in music may be shared by other species. For example, auditory 
rhythmic features arouse chickens (indexed by noradrenaline release) and 
affect memory consolidation (Judde and Rickard 2010; Rickard et al. 2005). 
The effect of subcomponents of music on other cognitive functions suggests 
that music can have fundamental as well as higher adaptive functions, and a 
comparative approach is needed to differentiate homology and analogy. Rather 
than taking the response to sound, in the form of music, as a starting point, 
perhaps learned vocal communication is being selected. In a range of species, 
learned vocal communication is used for mate attraction, on the basis of 
variability of F0 and syntax, which raises the question of why a “supranormal 
stimulus” effect of vocal sounds is not more common. Given the linkage of 
gesture with speech or of dance with music, it is a matter of debate whether 
the evolution of vocal learning was the driver for the emergence of language 
and music or was driven in part by the evolution of other embodied systems. 
For example, Arbib and Iriki (this volume) discuss the hypothesis that complex 
imitation of manual skills underwrote the evolution of manual gesture, and 
that the emergence of “protosign” provided a necessary scaffolding for the 
emergence of vocal learning in support of semantic expressivity. Alternatively, 
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the ability to regulate the expression of emotion, whether bodily (gestural, 
postural) or facial, may differentiate humans from other species. This hypothesis 
is rooted in our understanding of the human capacity to control the expression 
of emotion. At present, there is little evidence of comparable control of facial 
expressions and vocalization in nonhuman species, though some precursor 
ability has been shown in monkeys (Hihara et al. 2003). Other work (Slocombe 
and Zuberbühler 2007) suggests that chimpanzees have some control over the 
production of their vocalizations since they recruit speciﬁ c group members to 
support them in aggressive encounters. We share with our closest relatives the 
capacity to produce an initial affect burst in response to situational stress (see 
Scherer, this volume), but we know little about their capacity to shape and 
redirect such affect bursts. It is certainly the case that apes can be opportunistic 
in exploiting different channels for communication (e.g., Leavens et al. 2004; 
Liebal et al. 2004), and it may be that the multimodality which characterizes 
speech (and music in action) has its origins in such capacities. Humans, like 
all primates, mammals, and indeed most vertebrates, have a multifaceted 
repertoire of largely innate nonverbal emotional expressiveness, which 
includes a rich repertoire of speciﬁ cally vocal, emotional expressivity that is 
neither music, nor language, but which can be drawn upon by both of these for 
purposes of emotional coloring (e.g., in the dynamics and prosody of emotional 
speech). This preexisting largely innate repertoire is the key to the biology of 
emotional expressiveness in humans as in other species. However, if so, it must 
be stressed that the differences between such capacities and human music and 
language are immense.
Complex behaviors—such as acts of deception, binding the exercise 
of capacities for adopting the perspective of others with requirements to 
control mutually manifest behavior (e.g., vocalization)—may have provided 
grounds for the emergence of signals that have reference in relation to a state 
to be co-opted for proto-propositional use. Here, a parallel development of 
speech and music may be proposed, and the relationships between the raw 
expression of affect and the controlled articulation of art, whether linguistic 
or musical, could be explored. However, reasonably stable social groups 
would be needed to drive this process. One way of ﬁ nding evidence for these 
speculations is to examine the range of emotional vocalizations from “raw 
affect bursts” to culturally deﬁ ned quasi-lexical elements. This might shed 
light on the way in which raw vocalizations that we share with mammals have 
come under increasing control, both with respect to production and desired 
targets for communication. We note, however, that the control of the emotional 
expressions we share with other primates rests on medial circuitry (anterior 
cingulate as modulator of brainstem circuitry), whereas much of the circuitry 
associated with human language and music resides more laterally in the cortex 
(Jürgens 2009). Moreover, it is a classic observation going back to Hughlings 
Jackson in the 19th century that an aphasic may lose the propositional use of 
language yet still emit imprecations. Indeed, in humans, a crucial result of 
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evolution is that language can take over from direct, affect-induced action as a 
means of negotiating situations where different individuals’ needs or desires are 
manifestly in conﬂ ict. A further factor that could have driven the emergence of 
something like language is an increase in the ability, and motivation, to make 
plans in conjunction with others. Such planning requires shared goals and 
manipulation of nonexistent entities, enabling the composition of structures 
free from the immediate constraints of the physical world. Here, the range 
of theories seeking to link the evolution of brain mechanisms supporting 
language to those supporting tool use become especially relevant, with the 
notion that visualization of a goal may play a crucial role in planning the means 
to achieve it (Stout and Chaminade 2012). Off-line planning may (but need 
not) render concrete phenomena less immediately relevant, affording a means 
to displace reference (cf. Iriki 2011). Such considerations may underlie the 
evolution of both language and music. Not only is language’s propositionality 
built on reference to present and absent entities and events, but music affords 
an abstract domain for the construction of sound worlds that may be similarly 
grounded in experience yet divorced from immediate events.
The emergence of pedagogical capacities at some point in the hominin 
lineage may be a more speciﬁ c driver for the propositional and intentional 
dimensions of language. Pedagogy involves the intentional alteration of one’s 
behavior to inﬂ uence the mental states (attention, knowledge, embodied skills) 
of other individuals. In Arbib’s version of the gestural origins hypothesis 
(mirror system hypothesis; Arbib 2005), the transition to intentional 
communication requires a pantomimic/proto-sign phase. It could be argued that 
the intentionality of non-pantomimic communication in pedagogy shows that 
these substages may not be needed. The counterargument is that demonstration 
or modeling is an important part of pedagogy in natural environments. Gesture 
would be critical in such circumstances and would precede verbal instruction 
(Zukow-Goldring 1996, 2006). The need to communicate increasingly opaque 
causal relations in technological pedagogy also supplies a potential selective 
pressure for development of propositional meaning in language, but one must 
not conﬂ ate later stages of language evolution with their necessary precursors. 
Opaque causal relations are evidenced in skill transmission in modern humans, 
which involves not only direct communication, but also the creation of 
situations conducive for learning. This requires a high level of social cohesion, 
including (at least in modern humans) the development of appropriate skills 
and motivation for caregivers. The Vygotskian zone of proximal development 
(e.g., Vygotsky 1978) involves adult mentoring or scaffolding, which allows 
the learner to go beyond what he is capable of doing on his own. It refers 
to the difference between what the child can do independently and what he 
can do with adult assistance. The former indicates his state of knowledge or 
skill whereas the latter indicates his potential. In essence, it concerns culturally 
mediated learning rather than traditional pedagogy. This need for explicit 
support of the child’s mental development may be an additional selective 
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pressure in the expanding spiral for language (storytelling, kinship, etc.) and 
music (social bonding).
Language is marked out not just by its propositionality but by its complex 
propositionality, which entails compositionality, hierarchical structure, and 
complex syntax. These constitute very general capacities that are taken to high 
levels in language and, in some instances, music. These features are probably 
important for many evolutionarily relevant behaviors, but they are visible and 
testable in the archaeological record of stone tools. The archeological record 
of tools can document the expression of a particular depth/complexity of 
hierarchical action organization at a particular time, which provides a minimum 
indication of past hominin capacities. Stout’s work (e.g., Stout et al. 2008) 
provides PET and fMRI evidence of increasing activation of anterior inferior 
frontal gyrus (hierarchical cognition) in increasingly complex stone tool-
making as well as activation of medial prefrontal cortex during observation 
of tool-making by experts (intention attribution). A three-year longitudinal 
study of tool-making skill acquisition, which involves behavioral, social, 
archaeological (lithic analysis), neurofunctional (fMRI), and neuroanatomical 
(VBM, DTI) observations, is currently in progress, one output of which will 
be an empirically derived action syntax of Paleolithic tool-making. This work 
provides a clear and testable set of hypotheses concerning the emergence of 
capacities for compositionality and hierarchical structure and the facilitative 
effects of pedagogy. If an association can be established between the presence 
of vocal learning and the importance of “teaching” in other animals, its 
implications would be substantially broadened. The mirror system hypothesis 
would view such skill transfer as driving gestural communication more 
directly, with this in turn providing scaffolding for increasingly subtle vocal 
communication. In any case, much of human culture, and most of animal life, 
proceeds without pedagogy in any explicit, formal sense. That includes the 
acquisition of skills in many useful arts for which observational learning with 
“intent participation” often sufﬁ ces (Rogoff et al. 2003).
Pedagogy, in whatever form, appears to require the capacity for recognition 
of multiple levels of intention (“orders of intentionality”) and may be tied to the 
emergence of that capacity. It is suggested that chimpanzees have two orders of 
intentionality (“I believe that you intend…”), whereas humans can manage up 
to ﬁ ve or six (Dennett 1983). In any case, there is a chicken-and-egg problem 
in placing language and intentionality in evolutionary perspective, as language 
itself promotes development of ToM abilities, as indicated by the considerable 
lag in deaf children’s achievement of ToM milestones (Wellman et al. 2011).
One of the prime requisites for big-game hunting—a subsistence strategy 
of current hunter-gatherers and of several of our recent ancestor species—is 
the ability to second-guess prey and to coordinate group hunting behavior. A 
switch in the hominin lineage to social hunting, rather than scavenging, may 
have helped provide selection pressures for the emergence of the capacity for 
recognition of multiple levels of intention, though Bickerton (2009) argues 
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that scavenging, rather than hunting, provided the ecological niche that 
supported the emergence of language—perhaps too mono-causal a view of 
human evolution. It is notable that social hunting species, such as African 
hunting dogs and wolves, may have higher levels of intention recognition than 
nonsocial hunters, most likely driven by the demands of group hunting (Nudds 
1978). However, this is without a hint of leading to either music or language, 
so one must still seek that “something extra” in human evolution.
Social hunting necessitates close cooperation with others, and there is 
extensive human evidence for cooperation, collaboration, reciprocity, and 
shared goals. Tomasello (2008) argues that such cooperation is a precondition 
for the development of complex culture (i.e., involving learning in several 
domains) and for complex communication systems such as language and 
music. He also emphasizes the importance of ratcheting, so that each skill 
becomes the building block for others (Tomasello 1999; Tennie et al. 2009), 
thus explaining why human culture is so much richer than that of chimpanzees 
(Whiten et al. 1999). In humans, cooperation or helping others is evident even 
when there is no obvious beneﬁ t to the helper. Planning becomes critical in 
attaining difﬁ cult goals involving two or more individuals (e.g., hunting, 
sharing the spoils, achieving a division of labor that increases efﬁ ciency). 
Moreover, effective planning is greatly assisted by effective communication. 
There is reported nonhuman evidence of cooperative hunting (i.e., hunting 
in groups or packs), but these instances of apparent cooperation may simply 
maximize self-interest (for evidence on the lack of reciprocity in chimpanzee 
food sharing, see Gilby 2006). It is therefore unclear whether group hunting 
involves genuine cooperation. If cooperative motives were involved, the 
collaborators would be unlikely to ﬁ ght vigorously over the carcass, as they 
typically do. A major social change in our species might be revealed through 
the study of the social brain, or by means of social neuroscience. Indeed, the 
persistence over many generations of culturally transmitted behaviors, such as 
Acheulean technology in the Homo lineage, suggests that there must have been 
intense social cooperation and inhibition of aggression, which would predict 
signiﬁ cant frontal brain enlargement.
While these hypotheses stress the beneﬁ ts conferred by linguistic and 
musical interaction to individuals within the group, questions remain about who 
accrues the advantage (individual, kin group). The aforementioned hypotheses 
do not necessitate group selection, but are instead concerned with standard 
processes of natural and sexual selection, or with standard natural selection 
operating within the context of cultural niche construction (see, e.g., Laland et 
al. 1996). We do compete within groups, and such competition is often evident 
in processes of sexual selection, where we ﬁ nd the aesthetic extravaganzas of 
nature such as the peacock’s tail and elaborate bird song, which are intended 
to impress conspeciﬁ cs. In line with Darwin’s original suggestion that music 
arises as a consequence of processes of sexual selection (Darwin 1871), it 
is possible that aspects of music, such as pulse-based isochrony, might not 
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have derived from general processes of cooperation but from sexual selection 
pressures. Our ancestral setting of male territoriality and female exogamy 
could have led to synchronous chorusing by analogy with what occurs in some 
species of crickets and cicadas. Groups of territorial males could have become 
more effective at attracting migrating females by extending the reach of their 
hooting beyond territorial boundaries during the “carnival display.” The key to 
such an extension would be precise temporal superposition of voices, requiring 
predictive timing, enabled by synchrony to a common pulse (Merker et al. 
2009), although such a suggestion must remain speculative in the absence of 
clear evidence.
It must be noted that none of the above hypotheses are mutually exclusive. 
Instead, different strands and factors may have been operative at different times. 
While behavioral, cognitive, neuroscientiﬁ c, anthropological, archaeological, 
and ethological evidence can be used to narrow the possible problem space 
and make predictions concerning efﬁ cacy and general chronological ordering 
of various factors, these predictions may be testable by means of emerging 
genetic techniques. For example, the effects of sexual selection in the hominin 
lineage in the emergence of communicative behaviors may be tracked by 
exploring the prevalence of sexual dimorphism (not just behavioral, but also 
in terms of brain developmental control by sex steroids) by analyzing gene 
expression as new techniques are developed to interrogate the fossil DNA of 
coexisting hominin species.
Much of this discussion concerns the emergence of human communicative 
capacities without attempting to delineate why humans should have a 
plethora of communicative capacities at their disposal. While proximate, 
and in some instances, ultimate, adaptive functions have been sketched out 
for aspects of language and music, we must question why we possess at least 
two communicative systems that overlap so signiﬁ cantly in their operational 
characteristics.
We considered six ways of conceiving of the evolutionary relationships 
between language and music (Figure 21.1). While the ﬁ gure appears to 
present language and music as discrete or unitary domains, each may best 
be conceived of as opportunistic conﬂ ations of a mosaic of preexisting or 
extant capacities which themselves have diverse origins. Nevertheless, the 
models have heuristic value in delineating possible evolutionary relationships 
between music and language, given their current status and in the light of likely 
precursor capacities.
Of those precursor capacities, it can be suggested that the most compelling 
candidate for the origin of language and music is the capacity for vocal 
learning. All vocal animals produce innate calls expressive of emotional states. 
In the case of elaborate calls (still innate) these are sometimes called song, as 
in nonvocal learning songbirds (suboscines) or gibbons. In addition, a subset of 
these callers acquires and produces learned song (oscine birds, some cetaceans, 
and humans).Finally, a single species (humans) add a third something, 
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dependent on the crux of the second (i.e., vocal production learning); namely 
spoken language and vocal music. All vocal learning species produce what has 
been interpreted by some as “music” in the form of complex sonic patternings 
(“song”). If one views vocal learning as providing a general form of “music” 
that has value in mediating social interactions but that does not embody 
propositionality, this may favor the last model (Figure 21.1f: language arising 
as a fairly late offshoot of music), with the emergence of language enabling 
semantic decompositionality and information transfer.
Even if we think in these terms, perhaps the distinction arises from a cultural 
bias, which would favor the third model (Figure 21.2c: common origins), with 
different cultures exploiting language and music for different ends. However, 
whether a culture distinguishes between language and music may not have the 
same perceptual consequences as cross-cultural differences in the use of color 
terms. It may be more relevant to aim to distinguish the ways in which music 
and language are bound to the evolution through natural selection of speciﬁ c 
brain mechanisms or to processes of cultural evolution through the creation of 
ecological niches of cumulatively increasing social and artifactual complexity.
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Figure 21.1  Six possible models for the evolutionary emergence of language (L) and 
music (M), with the timeline running from the bottom of the ﬁ gure: (a) music and 
language have separate origins and remain distinct human faculties; (b) music and lan-
guage have the same origin and diverge to become distinct faculties; (c) music and 
language have the same origin and remain indissociable; (d) music and language have 
separate and distinct origins and converge over time to share features; (e) language’s 
origins precede those of music, which emerges as an offshoot (Herbert Spencer’s view); 
(f) music’s origins precede those of language, which emerges as an offshoot (Darwin’s 
view).
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To understand other behaviors and capacities, broader contexts may be 
needed to assess the relationships between music and language. Perhaps 
phenomena such as language and music are different intersecting subsets 
of broader capacities, such as shared intentionality, or of general mimetic 
capacities. Moreover, to extrapolate from the kinds of enactment found 
in contemporary cultures to early human evolutionary history may well be 
unfounded. Such enactments work for contemporary humans because we are 
inclined to mine meaning from our physical and social environments. Perhaps 
that capacity, which involves a bird’s eye view of the situation (in the form of 
a highly articulated theory of mind; Corradi-Del’Acqua et al. 2008), lies at the 
root of human communication. The emergence of a sense of self, a capacity 
to objectify ourselves and maintain a sense of self-continuity, and to relativize 
our experience of each other may underpin human communicative capacities.
Neither language nor music are purely vocal (or auditory); both constitute 
conceptual achievements that may be implemented by exploiting whatever 
tools are available at one’s disposal (vocality, gesture, pantomime, external 
signing). Some of the traits that characterize both language and music, such 
as syntax and sequencing, are evident in other vocal learning species. The 
vocal part of those traits has been inherited in the production part of the neural 
circuitry subserving learned vocalization in humans. The issue is to understand 
why humans combine compositional semantics with their vocal learning 
whereas other species do not. We have seen that some gestural theories favor 
motor learning, based on pantomime, in the development of meaningful 
protolanguage as a scaffolding for vocal learning, rather than postulating that 
our ancestors ﬁ rst developed meaningless “song.”
Revisiting the issue of humans’ exquisite control over vocalization 
in contrast to chimpanzees, one can ask what allowed humans to gain that 
control. For instance, if a chimp consistently fakes its vocalizations, it is 
likely to be ignored. Assuming a similar tendency in our common ancestor, 
how did we start to control our vocalizations? One possibility is that through 
“performing” to out-groups—making sounds that are out of place to deter 
predators (cf. Hagen and Hammerstein 2005)—early hominins derived 
the ability for displaced reference that is central to the linguistic faculty. 
For example, among the contemporary Mbendjele forest-dwelling hunter-
gatherers, women sing and co-talk in the forest to deceive other animals. That 
cooperative behavior drives bonding within the group, and the deception is 
oriented outside the group. Imitation skills, including nonconscious mimicry 
(Lakin et al. 2003), may be especially signiﬁ cant in the emergence of human 
cooperative and communicative capacities (Lewis 2009). If individual pleasure 
and group bonding derive from coordinated vocalization and movement, 
that would create pressure for more communication, with vocalizations and 
gestures moving from initially holistic (Wray 1998) or social (Dunbar 1996) 
signiﬁ cance to increasing analytic status. For example, in contemporary 
egalitarian societies based on sharing and absence of social hierarchicality, 
I. Cross et al. 
explicit instruction is a claim to more knowledge and higher status and is thus 
rare. Most speech in such contemporary societies is “need-expression in the 
form of request,” whereas much knowledge transmission is accomplished by 
means of pantomimetic display and mimicry (see Example 1 in the online 
supplemental information to this volume, http://esforum.de/sfr10/lewis.html: 
Mongemba’s account of an elephant hunt), which highlight expressiveness 
rather than efﬁ ciency of information transmission. It is notable that participants 
may experience a form of “transportation” as consequence of pantomimic 
representation, as the interaction requires displacement of the experienced 
world, potentially providing a trigger for the emergence of propositionality. 
Were such gestural, mimetic and “displacing” interactions to have part of early 
hominin repertoires, then a general theory linking gestural and vocal language 
origins with pedagogical process appears viable.
Although language and music may be functionally differentiable, that 
difference may be marked in such a way as to indicate its origin. For example, 
play interactions in canids are marked by a “play bow” to signify that the 
social and physical consequences of the interaction—within limits—are to 
be discounted. Music’s “lack of consequence”—the fact that engagement 
with others in music sanctions types of behavior which may be socially 
unacceptable in other contexts—seems parallel to play as a mode of social 
interaction. Perhaps music constitutes an offshoot of a common communicative 
faculty (see Figure 21.1f), emerging through pressures imposed by increasing 
altriciality to co-opt juvenile, exploratory modes of thought and behavior into 
the adult repertoire (Cross 2003a).
Irrespective of these considerations, the major obstacle to greater clarity 
in our understanding of the origins of music and language is our lack of 
knowledge of music in cultures other than those of the contemporary West 
and of its relationships to other aspects of culture, including language. Most 
cultures have been explored as linguistic cultures, not as linguistic and 
musical cultures. Our knowledge of the music of those cultures is simply not 
commensurable with our knowledge of the languages, in part because of a 
lack of consensus about the key elements of music that would allow for cross-
cultural comparison (despite heroic but much-criticized efforts such as those 
of Lomax 1968; for a sympathetic critique see Feld 1984). Until we have a 
sample of the rich information required to elaborate a principled theory of 
the relationships between what appears, from a Western, “etic” (i.e., outsider) 
perspective, to constitute music and language (requiring close collaboration 
between culture members and a range of human sciences), it will be difﬁ cult 
to gain any certainty about the origins of these human capacities. Our 
understanding of the relationship between language and music may be even 
more limited than we think it is. Undoubtedly, the ﬁ rst music was based on 
the voice—a biologically signiﬁ cant timbre—and much music across cultures 
continues to be based on the voice. Music is also intrinsically linked to regular 
and entrained collective movement—dance—in many societies. It is surprising, 
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then, that most research on music cognition has used instrumental timbres, 
typically synthesized, rather than vocal timbre, and has only in recent years 
begun to explore music in the context of individual and collective movement. 
Recent work indicates, however, that adults remember melodies better when 
they are presented vocally (on the syllable “la”) rather than instrumentally 
(Weiss et al. 2012), and that joint movement, in the form of dance, can enhance 
memory for person attributes (Woolhouse, Tidhar, and Cross, in preparation).
Triadic Niche Construction in Relation to 
Music and Language Origins
A signiﬁ cant role in any exploration and explanation of language-music 
relationships is likely to be played by Iriki’s theory of triadic niche construction 
(Iriki and Taoka 2012; Arbib and Iriki, this volume). A niche is a fragment 
of available environmental resources, and the process of ecological niche 
construction is a modiﬁ cation implemented by an animal to create his own 
niche. The interaction between the activity of the organism and its environment 
changes the environment, thereby changing selective pressures acting on the 
organism. In classic niche construction theory, there is a two-way interaction 
between behavior and environment. Quallo et al. (2009) have found that 
tool-use training in macaques led to an expansion in gray matter volume, 
affording extra neural machinery for the brain. This expansion in brain volume 
constitutes a “neural niche”—a newly available resource in the form of extra 
brain tissue—for future exploitation, affording the organism an increased 
range of responses (i.e., a “cognitive niche”) i ntroducing selective pressures 
which could, under some circumstances, amplify evolutionary effects.
This triad of neural niche, cognitive niche, and ecological niche are all 
operational for humans, allowing for an acceleration of their interaction in the 
course of our evolution, behavioral changes opening the door for later genetic 
changes. In effect, by changing the context of selection, different selection 
pressures come into play which may afford the possibility for new types of 
genetic change. If the information generated in the interaction is embedded 
in the structure of the environment, then it may be inherited by the next 
generation. In the context of human evolution, it could then be postulated that 
post-reproductive survival—the “grandmother” hypothesis—together with a 
means of transmitting knowledge critical to survival (e.g., such as language, 
or more particularly, mimetic and musical modes of presentation, display and 
participation) can allow the genetic pathway to be bypassed in the transmission 
of skill (Iriki 2010; Iriki and Taoka 2012). This would afford time for genetic 
assimilation, if it is necessary in the hominin lineage. This “Baldwinian 
evolution”—a mechanism that initially induced modiﬁ cation within the range 
of preprogrammed adaptation, and is then available for later mutations to 
optimize it—would be particularly beneﬁ cial for species with long life spans 
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and low birth rates (e.g., in primates with humans at the extreme, who need to 
survive evolutionarily signiﬁ cant contingencies through an individual capacity 
to adapt). This stands in sharp contrast to species with short life spans and 
mass reproduction, which adapt to environmental changes through variations 
in their numerous offspring, expecting at least a few to survive. Both of these 
mechanisms, however, would aid the adaptive radiation of the species in the 
terrestrial ecosystem.
Comparative and Phylogenetic Issues
While triadic niche construction provides an extremely promising candidate 
mechanism for establishing and consolidating language and music in 
the human communicative repertoire, an exploration of origins requires 
consideration of evidence from beyond the hominin clade so as to avoid being 
blinkered by unacknowledged anthropocentrism (Figure 21.2a). Processes, 
structure, and behaviors in other species that are homologous to or convergent 
with those implicated in music and language are informative about their bases 
and manifestations in humans; after all, identiﬁ cation of sub-components of 
these complex capacities may be more directly observable in some nonhuman 
species. The concept of genetic or deep homology (see Fitch and Jarvis, this 
volume)—a genetic basis for behavioral capacities that may be common across 
different lineages, evidenced in the recruitment (particularly in ontogeny) of 
similar sets of complex genes to subserve similar functions—has signiﬁ cant 
potential to elucidate connections between types of behavioral capacity in 
different species: thoses which do not originate from a common ancestor as 
well as those that may be simply convergent, motivated by environmental 
selection pressures that operate on distantly related organisms to exploit 
speciﬁ c types of environmental niche (Figure 21.2b).
While evolution is not progressive, there is a clear trend, at least in some 
lineages, toward increasing complexity, particularly in the hominin line. 
However, that complexity should not be considered independently of the 
systems that implement or enable it. With respect to song and language, when 
we compare, for example, a songbird with a human, we must ﬁ rst decide 
whether there is common design and then ask: How did these things emerge? 
Homology (i.e., the explanation that is likely the ﬁ rst port of call in answering 
the question) can be speciﬁ ed as either behavioral, anatomical or structural, 
developmental, or genetic (deep), this latter being evident in the common role 
played by certain genes (such as PAX6 in vision or FOXP2 in vocalization: see, 
e.g., White et al. 2006; Fernald 2000) in very distantly related species. We note, 
however, that a genetic network could have been recruited independently in 
two different species and may have functioned differently in different ancestor 
species. In the case of songbirds and humans, behavioral relationships in vocal 
capacity are clearly analogous rather than homologous, but may be motivated 
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by deep homologies at the genetic level that afford the emergence of similarly 
functioning neural circuitry recruited for species-speciﬁ c ends.
Hence it is possible to view aspects of the origins of music and language 
as embedded in a deep homology that is manifested at the genetic level; 
convergence may be occurring at the organ level (larynx in humans, syrinx in 
birds) but homology at the genetic level. The vocality that underpins speech 
and music may have deep homology across all vocal learners, with the motor 
learning circuitry being co-opted independently for vocal learning in different 
species. Nevertheless, vocal learning is only one of the constellations of 
features that can be identiﬁ ed as underpinning language and music. Humans’ 
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Figure 21.2  Venn diagrams depicting relationships among various cognitive capaci-
ties of different species. Sets are classiﬁ ed by (a) species (anthropocentrism) or (b) 
cognitive domains (ecological relativisim). In the anthropocentric view (a), cognitive 
domains are expressed as subsets within respective species set, partly overlapping with 
other species. In this way, humans tend to privilege only those included in the human 
set, making it difﬁ cult to recognize that other species may have cognitive abilities su-
perior to humans (as shaded outside the “human set”). This perspective can lead to the 
misleading perception that nonhuman species are intrinsically inferior to humans. In 
contrast, when sets are classiﬁ ed by cognitive domains (b), species are depicted through 
a combination of subsets to illustrate inter-relationships between species’ capacities. 
These cognitive domains and their combinations in species must be considered to have 
evolved through interactions with ecological conditions of habitats, thus, ecological 
relativism.
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complex sociality, excessive brain (cortex) size, and capacity for cultural 
conservation and transformation of knowledge all seem likely to have played 
a signiﬁ cant role in shaping our communicative capacities. It would be highly 
desirable to track the extent to which those aspects shared with our closest 
nonhuman relative represent true homologies. However, we are limited by a 
lack of knowledge of primate evolution immediately prior to our last common 
ancestor, whose capacities must be extrapolated (perhaps uninformatively) 
from those of their descendants. Nevertheless, even in absence of such data 
it might be possible to use datable divergences between existing nonhuman 
primate species to explore human cognitive functions such as language and 
music. For example, new world monkeys may provide a fertile experimental 
model as they have a wide range of vocal capacities as well as cooperative 
social structures. In the “old world,” humans established their unique niche 
by dividing resources with other primates—apes and old world monkeys. In 
contrast, in the “new world,” where humans did not exist, adaptive radiation 
should have developed differently. That is, the traits which characterize human-
speciﬁ c cognition, of which precursors should have derived from common 
ancestors and become extinct in nonhuman old world primates, might have 
preserved in the new world monkey lineages by deep homology and could 
be expressed in extant taxa through epigenetic interactions as convergent 
evolution. As such, new world monkeys could represent an ideal animal model 
to study various aspects of human-speciﬁ c higher cognitive functions.
Conclusion
To return to the point made at the outset: when considering relationships 
between language and music from cultural and evolutionary perspectives, there 
is a pressing need to avoid presentist and anthropocentric biases in making 
inferences about cultural categories and evolutionary trajectories. Music and 
language may be different domains of human thought and behavior; they may 
be different manifestations of the same underlying capacities; or they may 
be the same suite of communicative capacities co-opted for different ends in 
different situations. They may have evolved separately or conjointly, or they 
may have merged or split over the course of human evolution. They or their 
subcomponents may be present in the repertoire of other species, or they may 
be unique to humans. Only by synthesizing evidence from the whole range of 
human sciences, in the context of investigations that are alert to cross-cultural 
differences in the conceptualization and implementation of communicative 
skills and the features shared with other species, can we achieve a degree of 
defensible clarity in our understanding.
